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INTRODUCTION 
Overview 
People function so as to confirm existing beliefs that are consistent with one’s 
self-concept.  Mediated through a number of specific motives (Kowalski & Westen, 
2005),  the self-concept is a schema that includes cognitive generalizations which guide 
the way in which information pertinent to one’s self is processed and perceived (Markus, 
1977).  The desire to confirm one’s self-conceptions is referred to by Swann (1983) as the 
theory of “self-verification” and states that in order to support one’s perceptions of a 
situation, including its predictability and controllability, a person will strive to confirm 
their own self-conceptions even in the event in which they are false (Heider, 1958; Kelly, 
1955; Lecky, 1945, Rodin & Voshart, 1986). Swann and Read (1981) found that social 
interactions act as opportunities for people to verify their self conceptions and that more 
social feedback is desired when individuals suppose it will serve the purpose of 
confirming their self-conceptions.   People self-verify their beliefs in accordance with 
their positive or negative self-views (Pinel & Swann, 2000) resulting in a preference for 
negative feedback among those with negative self-views (Swann et  al. 1992).  Thus, the 
desire for self-verification in individuals with negative self-views is stronger than the 
desire for positive evaluations (Swann, 1997).   
 However, continually seeking out negative evaluations can have harmful 
consequences to the individual.  Self-verification is considered particularly problematic 
in the onset and maintenance of psychiatric disorders such as depression (Giesler & 
Swann, 1999).  In a study by Swan, Wenzlaff and Tafarodi (1992) involving depression 
and self-verification, it was found that individuals sought to confirm their self-beliefs, 
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even if those beliefs were negative.  Individuals with negative self-views had a preference 
for being evaluated less favorably than those with positive self-views, despite the fact that 
they were equally disturbed by negative feedback as those with positive self-views 
(Swan, et  al., 1992).   Joiner (1995) confirmed that an increasing vulnerability and a 
heightened risk of depressive symptoms are associated with those seeking and receiving 
negative feedback.  In addition to being related to peer rejection, negative feedback is 
strongly associated with cognitive aspects of depression (Joiner, Katz & Lew, 1997).  
Continually looking for and verifying negative feedback has been proposed to sustain 
one’s self-concept, resulting in a feedback loop of self-confirming, yet damaging beliefs 
that may perpetuate the length of depression (Andrews, 1989).  Similarly, self-
verification (Swann, 1983) represents one mechanism for those with varying health 
beliefs to selectively attend to certain illness-related information. 
 Festinger (1957) offered one possibility that would speak to the reason for which 
individuals seek to self-verify.   His concept of cognitive dissonance proposes that people 
seek to match their beliefs with their actions (Festinger, 1962).  Subsequent beliefs and 
behaviors (or new pieces of information) may be perceived as disagreeing with one 
another, leading to psychological tension that may motivate the person to either change 
their beliefs or their behaviors (Kowalski & Westen, 2005).  The presence of dissonance, 
described as non-fitting cognitive relationships, results in efforts to reduce it as well as 
the avoidance of both interactions and information that could produce increased 
dissonance (Festinger, 1962).  The theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) holds 
that the amount of psychological tension or dissonance that is present after an action has 
been completed is directly proportional to how many elements are believed to be 
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inconsistent with the chosen behavior.  According to Festinger (1962), the more conflict 
that results when an individual makes their decision, the more he or she will attempt to 
justify their decision after the fact.  In reference to how much dissonance is actually 
elicited and the extent to which the person feels the need to overcome it is dependent on 
both the perception of choice and the size of the rewards and punishments (Kowalski & 
Westen, 2005).  Cognitive dissonance can thus be viewed as a motivating, preceding 
condition which facilitates desires to reduce psychological anxiety that is caused by 
discrepant beliefs and actions (Festinger, 1962).   
Hypochondriasis 
 The willingness to accept the presence of a health problem falls along a broad 
continuum. Health beliefs range from the repeated dismissal of obvious signs of illness to 
preoccupation with an illness that does not exist; both of which can reach pathological 
proportions.  The various ways in which one might respond to a health threat are 
dependent on the person’s readiness to accept the presence of an illness as well as the 
extent to which a person perceives the health threat is probable or salient.  Those with 
somatoform disorders such as clinical and sub-clinical manifestations of hypochondriasis 
are prone to adopt relatively irrational health-related concerns.  Speckens (2001) 
describes hypochondriasis as a “false belief in illness”.  Defined as a preoccupation with 
illness due to the misinterpretation of bodily symptoms (Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, American Psychiatric Association, 1994), hypochondriasis 
is a psychiatric disorder characterized in large part by a readiness to accept the presence 
of a health problem.  Diagnostic criteria for clinical hypochondriasis require that one 
experiences at least six months of fears of having or the idea that one has a serious 
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disease based on the person’s misinterpretation of bodily symptoms.  Hypochondriasis 
causes clinically significant distress, persists despite medical reassurance and is not due 
to a general medical condition or other mental disorder (Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, American Psychiatric Association, 1994). 
 Health preoccupation may involve perceived symptoms in a number of areas 
including bodily functions, minor physical abnormalities or physical sensations that are 
not easily identified (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994).  However, when examined by a medical health 
professional, these individuals are found to be without any general health condition that 
would justify their somatosensory experiences.  Coined by Barsky and Klerman (1983), 
somatic amplification is a term referring to the experience of intense, noxious, and 
disturbing bodily sensations resulting from sensory, perceptual or cognitive distortions.  
According to Barsky (2001), the hypochondriacal patient’s amplification of bodily 
symptoms is most closely associated with their tendency to perceive an exaggerated risk 
of disease and illness.  Among the illnesses and diseases that they feel most susceptible 
include arthritis, ulcers, insomnia and diabetes (Barsky, 2001).  Hypochondriasis is also 
associated with the occurrence of other psychiatric disorders, mainly Axis I disorders 
affecting mood and anxiety (Barsky, Wyshak, & Klerman, 1992) as well as psychological 
distress, help seeking and impaired functioning (Barsky et al., 1990; Guereje et al., 1997;  
Looper & Kirmayer, 2001).  Although 50 percent of people experiencing high 
hypochondriacal fears can be initially alleviated by primary care reassurance, 
hypochondriasis is generally considered a chronic condition (Barsky, Wyshak & 
Klerman, 1990). Thus, those who persist with their health concerns despite medical 
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reassurance represent a distinct population when compared to those whose health 
concerns are present, but more easily resolved.   
Hypochondriacal Costs and Maintenance 
 Hypochondriasis can be costly, both to the health care system and the individual.  
Within the medical outpatient population, it is estimated that the prevalence of 
hypochondriasis falls between 4 and 6 percent (Barksy, Wyshak, Klerman, & Latham, 
1990).  Repeated attempts to confirm suspicions of illness via health care professionals 
causes considerable strain on health care resources, and the global effects on the health 
care system in general are highly problematic and a cause for concern.  Indeed, upwards 
of 50% of adult ambulatory costs are attributable to cases of hypochondriasis (Collyer, 
1979), and hypochondriacal individuals are responsible for a large portion of medical 
health care costs (Monson & Smith, 1983; Wagner & Curran, 1984).  In addition, 
individuals with hypochondriasis suffer from a variety of consequences resulting from 
their condition including psychological distress, help seeking and impaired functioning 
(Barsky et al. 1990).  Their medical complaints often result in hospitalization, elaborate 
diagnostic workups, appendectomies and cholecystectomies for suspected adhesions or 
pinched nerves, and develop into long histories of numerous unnecessary surgeries (Ford, 
Kayton & Lipkin, 1993).  Symptomatic or inappropriate treatments can cause serious 
complications and side effects, as well as the possibility of death (Howes, 1998).   
     According to Escobar, Gara, Waitzkin, Silver, Holman and Compton (1998), 
hypochondriacal patients are also more impaired in their physical functioning than 
patients without the disorder.  For example, their risk of having moderate to severe 
occupational disability is at least twice as likely as the risk for non-hypochondriacal 
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individuals (Gureje, Ustun, & Simon, 1997).  Their impairment on standard physical 
functioning scales is equal or greater to those with chronic debilitating conditions and 
when compared to most patients with major medical health problems, hypochondriacal 
people spend two to three times more time resorting to bed rest (Barsky, Fama, Bailey, & 
Ahern, 1998; Smith, Rost, & Kashner, 1995). 
 Both cognitive and perceptual distortions are also indicated in the development 
and maintenance of clinical hypochondriasis.  Health preoccupation may involve 
perceived symptoms in a number of areas including bodily functions, minor physical 
abnormalities or physical sensations that are not easily identified (Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, American Psychiatric Association, 1994).  
However, when examined by a medical health professional, these individuals are found to 
be without any general health condition that would justify their somatosensory 
experiences.   
Hypochondriacal and Normative Responses to Health Threats 
 The variability in health concern is reflected in the dramatic differences between 
clinical and non clinical populations with regard to their readiness to accept a diagnosis.  
Those with clinical hypochondriasis experience the most extensive worry, concern and 
fear of having an illness (Hersen & Turner, 2003).  Sub-clinical hypochondriacs are 
already inclined to believe that they have a health problem, they report symptoms 
associated with their health concerns, and actively engage in “doctor shopping” (Lecci & 
Cohen, 2002).  Thus, those with hypochondriasis seek out illness (presumably 
confirming) information, especially if illness concerns have been activated (Barsky, et al., 
2001).  In contrast, Weinstein (1980) found that those without hypochondriasis consider 
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themselves to be healthy; they initially deny the presence of a health problem and are 
reluctant to seek medical attention that may confirm the presence of a physical health 
problem.  People who are low in hypochondriasis prefer to disconfirm the possibility of 
illness, and pay less attention to illness confirming information.  However, both non 
clinical and sub clinical populations subscribe to the general belief that one is at less risk 
than someone else to experience a negative event, a concept referred to as unrealistic 
optimism (Weinstein, 1980).   
      Importantly, unrealistic optimism and self-confirming biases are the same for non 
hypochondriacal people in that they believe that they are less likely than others to have 
illness and therefore look to disconfirm evidence of illness to confirm the belief that they 
are healthy.  However, the two biases are not the same in the case of hypochondriacal 
individuals because although they believe they are less likely than others to have an 
illness, they nonetheless look for evidence of illness to confirm the belief that they are 
unwell (Warwick & Salkovskis, 1989).  In accordance with the literature on unrealistic 
optimism, Barsky, Ahern, Bailey, Saintfort, Liu and Peekna (2001) have found that most 
people - including those with hypochondriacal tendencies - underestimate their risk of 
illness as compared to others of the same sex and age.  Those with hypochondriasis tend 
not to differ from the normal population with regard to their worry of other threats such 
as accidents of criminal victimization, but feel more susceptible to illness because of the 
amplification of benign bodily sensations (Barsky, et al. 2001).  They overestimate their 
own susceptibility to illness as well as that of others (Barsky, et al. 2001). 
      Although unrealistic optimism with regard to health threats occurs in clinical and 
non clinical populations, it can yield very different results.  When presented with the 
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same information about an event, people’s cognitive and perceptual interpretations of that 
information often vary.  In fact, it was found that exposure to evidence that differs from 
one’s own beliefs is generally avoided (McGuire, 1961). For example, as opposed to 
those with normative health beliefs, hypochondriacal individuals repeatedly seek out 
multiple doctors to confirm what they perceive is a serious health problem.  Through 
“selective attention” (Broadbent, 1958; Triesman, 1960), defined by Lecci and Cohen 
(2002) as a pattern of processing perceptual stimuli that may distort reality, they will seek 
out information that confirms their illness beliefs, especially in the case where their 
concerns have been activated (Barsky, et al., 2001).     
Situational Interpretations 
          The readiness with which one accepts the possibility of having health threatening 
conditions is affected by the situation (Lecci & Cohen, 2002; Broadbent, 1958; Triesman, 
1960 ). According to Weinstein (1980), unrealistic optimism influences the way one 
perceives an event and each event has certain characteristics upon which realistic 
optimism is dependent.  Research suggests that individuals believe themselves to be less 
likely than others to experience negative as opposed to positive events, and are 
particularly skeptical about events occurring that are of low probability (Weinstein, 
1980).  Likewise, people inaccurately perceive themselves as invulnerable to event 
information perceived as being controllable (such as health hazards). They fail to 
acknowledge that their actions are responsible for determining negative outcomes and 
view their psychological attributes as reducing their illness vulnerability (Weinstein, 
1984).   
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Differential interpretations of event characteristics between hypochondriacal and 
non-hypochondriacal individuals are best explained by differing motivations for an 
individual’s reasoning that affect any or all stages of “hypothesis testing” (Kunda 1990).  
Like people with normative health beliefs, hypochondriacal individuals are motivated to 
arrive at directional conclusions in order to confirm their pre-existing beliefs (Kunda, 
1990; Pyszczynski, Holt, & Greenberg, 1987).  Directional conclusions affect reasoning 
(memory listing, reaction time and rule use) by affecting what information will be 
considered (Kunda, 1990).  For example, one way in which directional conclusions affect 
reasoning is by influencing an individuals’ tendency to over rationalize and construct 
their own beliefs. The construction of beliefs is a process which is largely outside of the 
individual’s awareness (Pyszcszynski, Holt, & Greenberg, 1987).  For example, 
Weinstein (1980) found that those with normative health beliefs view negative events as 
less likely to happen to them when they are undesirable.  In contrast, a person with 
hypochondriasis may view a negative, undesirable event as more likely to occur as a 
result of their motivated reasoning to maintain their self-beliefs.  Whereas a high 
probability event may be seen as more likely to happen by a non-hypochondriacal person, 
the hypochondriacal individual sees it as more likely to happen to them (Weinstein, 
1980).  Clearly, such beliefs go against logical reasoning and suggest that the cognitive 
mechanisms being utilized are not intended to reach accurate conclusions, but directional 
ones that concur with an alternate set of underlying perceptions and beliefs.     
       Warwick and Salkovskis (1989) maintain that in the case of a hypochondriacal 
individual, disconfirmation of evidence suggesting that one is ill is actually perceived as a 
negative event.  Dissonance theory (Kunda, 1990) predicts that in the event that health 
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concerns are not validated, a patient continues to struggle with the tensions between two 
inconsistent beliefs (i.e., they are both sick and well). When left unresolved, such a 
situation usually results in increased anxiety and rumination and thus repeated 
reassurance of satisfactory health may contribute to the maintenance of the disorder as 
well as resulting in increased self checking behaviors to reconfirm their initial health 
convictions (Warwick & Salkovskis, 1989).   
Awareness of Health-Based Biases 
 Despite the fact that a limited amount of research addresses the issue of how 
aware one is of his or her self-confirming biases in regard to perceptions of health-related 
information, past literature would suggest that people are not aware of their own general 
biases and that behavior aimed at achieving directional goals is due to largely 
unconscious processes.  A person pursuing a directional goal modifies and interprets 
information to arrive at a desired outcome which appears rationally thought out.  Because 
this process is intended to protect a person’s self concept by confirming their self-beliefs, 
it would not be effective if people were aware that they were engaging in such behavior.  
Thus, it is likely that this process is an unconscious one.  Hypochondriacal individuals 
who are motivated to self-confirm the presence of a suspected illness are most likely not 
consciously aware of their own bias to choose information that supports their directional 
goals; in this case, to self confirm their beliefs of illness.  It might be reasonable to 
suggest that one with hypochondriacal tendencies should apply the same unconscious 
processes by disregarding information that disagrees with their directional goals because 
it fails to confirm what the individual believes is true.  Individuals not evidencing 
hypochondriacal tendencies should act similarly because they are motivated to self-
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confirm the belief that they are healthy. As a result, they too would remain unaware of 
their directional goals and would be biased to ignore information that suggests the 
presence of an illness.   
 In general, the unconscious (implicit) processing of perceivable yet nonessential 
information functions as an adaptive mechanism in that it conserves the amount of space 
allotted for information that must be processed simultaneously (Bargh & Chartrand, 
1999).  Instead, situational factors outside of conscious awareness account for much of an 
individual’s experiences. Each individual possesses goals that can be activated 
unconsciously without a person being aware of their motives for behaving in a certain 
way to meet those goals (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999).  Experiments by Bargh and 
Chartrand (2001) demonstrate that primed information-processing goals as well as goals 
that have been activated by a conscious act of will result in the same outcomes. 
Regardless as to the level of awareness associated with a goal, once activated, that 
person’s behavior will function so as to carry out his or her goals effectively (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 2001).  Thus, behaviors, decisions, and judgments rely on how available 
information relates to that individual’s goals (Bargh & Chartrand, 2001). 
 Goal-directed, unconscious behavior can become either automatic, implicit, or 
both.  Behavior becomes automatic as it develops over time from consistent and repeated 
exposure to phenomena due to either a person’s intentions to attain a goal, or past 
tendencies to respond similarly when in certain situations (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999).  
For a process to be considered automatic it must not occur with intention, conscious 
awareness, and it should not interference with other mental activities (Posner, 1978; 
Spielman, Pratto & Bargh, 1988).  Implicit behaviors and goals are those which are 
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implied or understood though not directly expressed.  Aside from occurring 
automatically, after time individuals may remain unaware of the fact that their behavior is 
directed at achieving a certain goal and thus, unintentional behavior is said to be implicit 
(Neisser, 1967; Posner & Snyder, 1975; Triesman, 1960 cited in Bargh & Chartrand, 
1999).  However, goal-directed behavior can occur unconsciously in that it is both 
automatic and implicit.  The more automatic a behavior becomes, the more implicit it 
may seem and vice-versa.  Yet, it is not necessary for automatic goal-directed behavior to 
be implicit, nor is it necessary for implicit behavior to occur automatically.  Whether 
automatic, implicit, or both, Bargh and Chartrand (1999) point out that experiences that 
occur unconsciously are not remembered as being non-consciously processed.   
 The automaticity of hypochondriacal goal-directed behavior may gradually 
increase over time and therefore may not be as pronounced in younger (e.g., college-
aged) samples.  In a study by Karoly and Lecci (1993), college-aged females with 
hypochondriasis were found to have a relatively larger amount of illness-related goals 
when compared to their non-hypochondriacal peers, and viewed those illness-related 
goals as being more important. An overemphasis on attaining illness-related goals might 
be expected to limit how much time could be spent on other non-health related goals.   
However, despite the amount of time spent in pursuit of health-related goals, this did not 
prevent the hypochondriacal students from pursuing non-health related goals (Karoly & 
Lecci, 1993).  One explanation for this might be that the relatively young 
hypochondriacs’ behavior had not yet “developed” enough so as to disrupt the 
functioning of non-health pursuits. The conclusion was that given more time and 
indulgence in health-focused goals, unconscious behaviors might become increasingly 
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automatic for hypochondriacs and result in more potentially harmful deficits in 
psychosocial functioning (Karoly & Lecci, 1993).  In a subsequent study, Lecci, Karoly, 
Ruehlman and Lanyon (1996) did in fact find evidence for a developmental trend, 
suggesting that older (inveterate) hypochondriacs have an even greater number of health-
related goals, and these goals are perceived as more central to their cognitive functioning.  
The Present Study 
Although much is known about the ways in which individuals evidencing 
hypochondriacal tendencies ultimately react to information suggesting their illness fears 
are unsubstantiated, research has not yet addressed the question of what kind of health 
feedback those with varying degrees of hypochondriasis prefer to receive.  The theory of 
self-verification presents a strong motive for hypochondriacal and non-hypochondriacal 
individuals to selectively attend to illness confirming and illness disconfirming 
information, respectively. Likewise, dissonance theory might predict that individuals in 
this situation would experience stress when their health beliefs are not confirmed. 
Moreover, individuals experiencing a health threat would be most likely to arrive at 
directional conclusions about their health by attending to proportionately more 
information that confirms their initial health-related beliefs (i.e., an impending health 
threat should initially strengthen existing beliefs).  The present study will investigate the 
role of illness fear activation in affecting the attentional biases of individuals evidencing 
varying degrees of hypochondriacal tendencies by examining a controlled situation in 
which mock patients interact with a mock doctor and have the opportunity to select either 
illness confirming or illness disconfirming information. 
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Hypotheses 
First, it was hypothesized that the greater the hypochondriacal tendencies the 
more the individual would select illness confirming information relative to illness 
disconfirming information.  The second hypothesis was that there would be an interaction 
between hypochondriacal tendencies and the experimental induction of illness fears such 
that if illness fears are activated, those with higher hypochondriacal tendencies would 
show a greater effect for selecting illness confirming information relative to those with 
lower hypochondriacal tendencies and would be more concerned about illness confirming 
information relative to illness disconfirming information as compared to those with lower 
hypochondriacal tendencies.  This hypothesis was based on past research suggesting that 
activating illness concerns (i.e., an illness induction) heightens hypochondriacal fears 
(see Lecci & Cohen, 2002). Importantly, hypochondriacal tendencies will here be 
theoretically considered and assessed as a continuous variable, with the assumption that 
higher scores more accurately reflect the functioning of sub-clinical hypochondriacs and 
lower scores more accurately reflect the functioning of normative health beliefs (see 
Lecci, 2004). 
 
METHOD 
Participants 
The participants in this study consisted of 199 participants from Introduction to 
Psychology classes, including 147 females and 52 males aged 18 to 37 years of age.  A 
total of 29 participants’ data was removed from the study.  One subject opted not to 
complete the study, while another was found to have a suspicious pattern of responding 
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on the hypochondriasis measures indicating invalid data.  Seven participants were 
eliminated because they lacked any variability in their believability ratings and an 
additional 20 participants were taken out because of malfunctions in the computer 
program that may have affected the believability of the procedure. Three participants also 
had missing data on at least one of the variables of interest.  The resulting number of 
participants was 167, including 103 females and 44 males. Of the original sample, all 
subjects were assigned to either the control (N = 101) or experimental (N = 98) condition 
and received 1 hour of course credit for their participation in the experiment. 
Measures   
     Whitely Index  
The Whitely Index (WI) was used to assess hypochondriasis, and includes the 
constructs of disease fear, disease conviction, and bodily preoccupation (see Appendix 
G).  This scale consists of two subscales, including the Illness Conviction and the Illness 
Worrying scale (Fink, Edwald, Jensen et. al., 1997).  The full test has a test-retest figure 
of .81 over a 28-week period (Pilowsky, 1967) and the intrascale consistency of the 13-
item WI varies between .84 and .95 (Barsky, Wyshak, 1989; et al., 1990c, 1992b, 1998).   
      SAMPI  
Participants were also given the SAMPI, a self-report index of measuring 
sensitivity perception to physical sensations.  This 5- item likert scale measures 
individual differences in hypochondriacal tendencies has been shown to have a reliability 
of .85 over 28-day interval (Barsky et  al., 1990), e.g.  “I am often aware of various 
things happening within my body.”   The SAMPI and Whitely have a typical correlation 
of 0.56 (Barsky and Wyshak, 1990). This scale will be the preferred assessment of 
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hypochondriacal tendencies for two reasons. First, it more accurately detects subtle 
manifestations of hypochondriasis due to the fact that the items have lower face validity. 
A second reason is that past research (Lecci & Cohen, 2002, in press) has shown the 
SAMPI to be more sensitive than the Whitely in detecting variability in hypochondriacal 
tendencies most associated with subtle affects that are attributed to attention.  
     Speilburger’s State Anxiety Scale  
In order to control for individual differences in state anxiety, participants were 
administered Speilburger’s State Anxiety Scale (STAI), a 20-item self report 
questionnaire measuring state as opposed to trait anxiety and rating current anxiety on a 
likert scale ranging from 1 to 4 (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970).  
Procedure 
 Participants were assigned to either an illness protective condition or an illness 
fear induction condition.  All individuals participated in a computer-based program after 
being randomly assigned to one of two conditions involving testing for an enzyme called 
PKR.  Participants were told that the first part of the study involved a brief health exam 
including blood pressure and heart rate measurements as well as an enzyme testing that 
was being done in order to assess the overall risk of contracting meningitis on the UNCW 
campus.  The enzyme testing procedure closely mimicked the procedure employed in a 
study by Croyle and Ditto (1990) in which glucose-sensitive paper was used in place of 
enzyme test paper.  Similar to the Croyle and Ditto (1990) study, participants were 
informed in a brief article that the enzyme PKR was related to meningitis susceptibility 
and could be detected in a person’s saliva by chemically coated testing paper.  Written 
instructions were given to participants by experimenters wearing white lab coats and 
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stethoscopes concerning how to self-administer the enzyme test.  First, participants were 
instructed to rinse with a cup of mouthwash and spit it back into the cup.  Second, they 
were asked to spit into another small cup before placing the chemically coated enzyme 
test into the saliva.  Because participants were instructed to first rinse with mouth wash in 
which glucose had been added before self-administering the enzyme test, the results of 
the test were the same for each individual – the glucose sensitive paper turned blue-green. 
Regardless of the participant’s condition, the blue-green color indicated the presence of 
the enzyme. Interpretation of these results varied as a function of the participant’s 
assigned condition.   
 All documents given to participants explaining the procedure contained the same 
introductory information with the exception of the interpretation of the results.  
Participants in the illness fear induction condition were told that the enzyme PKR 
destroys large white blood cells that protect the body against pathogens responsible for 
meningitis, and in turn, increases their susceptibility to this illness.  Therefore, the 
presence of the enzyme indicated by the blue-green test paper results indicated that they 
are more susceptible to meningitis than others who do not have the enzyme present in 
their body.  This was expected to result in illness fear activation for this condition.  The 
same section of information regarding the interpretation of the enzyme paper results 
differed slightly for those who were assigned to the illness protective condition.  In the 
illness protective condition, the presence of the enzyme was a positive outcome of the 
test because the information they were given described the enzyme’s presence as a 
preventative factor for meningitis, thus decreasing their susceptibility compared to others.  
These individuals were told that the enzyme PKR facilitates the production of large white 
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blood cells that protect the body against pathogens that cause meningitis, and therefore 
they were less susceptible to the illness than others.  Presumably, in this condition illness 
fears should have been deactivated.   
 After participating in the PKR enzyme test, the participant was told that the 
second part of the study involved assessing the effectiveness of communication between 
medical staff at the health center and students on campus.  It was explained that doctors 
have different "styles" of interacting with patients and that matching doctor-patient 
communication styles is essential to quick and effective treatment, especially if a serious 
threat to one’s health should arise.  According to the information given to participants, 
the computer task that follows the meningitis enzyme screening would assess which 
doctors would be the best communication “match” for them in the event that they should 
develop a serious illness.  Next, all participants took part in a computer task in which they 
had the opportunity to choose from a series of confirming and disconfirming statements 
that may or may not suggest that they have a serious illness.  The statements were 
determined to be credible by the results of a pilot study.  Participants in the pilot study (N 
= 60) rated statements with regard to their credibility as being related to a diagnosis of 
meningitis using a 5-point likert scale with 4 denoting a “very credible” statement and 0 
denoting a “not at all credible” statement. Only those statements with the highest 
credibility scores (approximately the top 40% of the items) were selected for the  
computer task. 
The procedure for the present study was based on a computer software program 
that allowed the participant to choose illness confirming or disconfirming information by 
clicking the appropriate box on the screen with a mouse.  The choices were organized 
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into categories on opposite sides of the display.  Each set of information served as a 
makeshift doctor’s feedback that he or she would give to a patient and was labeled as 
either ‘Doctor A.’ or ‘Doctor B.’ according to whether it was illness confirming or 
disconfirming information.  However, the participants were not told that there was a 
difference between the information provided by Dr. A and Dr. B.  Participants began the 
task by being asked to view four pieces of information from doctor A and doctor B.  The 
order in which the individual was presented information from a particular doctor was 
counterbalanced.  Because participants were less likely to already be aware of their own 
biases and motivations, avoiding labeling of each category of information should have 
yielded a greater effect, as well as increased generalizability.  Whereas, if the information 
were to be labeled, participants might have been more inclined to modify their behaviors 
and attempt to choose equally among illness confirming and disconfirming information 
from each doctor.  The primary purpose for this initial trial was to familiarize participants 
with the contents of both sets of information (labeled Dr. A and Dr. B) while enabling 
participants to establish any preferences for selecting one type of illness related 
information over another. 
 The participants were given 8 trials and 24 choices for a total of 32 selections.  
The number of selections desired was based on a pilot study by Morris and Lecci (in 
press) which determined that participants are less accurate at estimating the number of 
facts they have selected after being exposed to thirty or more facts.  The first 8 pieces of 
information viewed were not chosen voluntarily, but acted as a trial in which participants 
were familiarized with the type of choices offered by each doctor in the computer 
simulation.  For example, the participant viewed the first four pieces of information from 
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Dr. A (illness confirming information) and the next four pieces of information from Dr. B 
(illness disconfirming information).  The order in which the doctor’s information was 
viewed was counterbalanced.  The participants were then free to choose which doctor’s 
information was viewed for the remaining 24 selections. For all selections, the 
participants were asked to rate the quality of the presented information (for each fact) by 
assessing its believability and the degree to which the information resulted in some 
degree of concern using ratings scaled from 1 to 5.  When rating the extent to which the 
information was believable, a rating of 1 indicated that it was very believable whereas a 
rating of 5 indicated that the information was very unbelievable.  For the rating of 
concern second, a score of 1 indicated that one was very concerned and a rating of 5 
indicated they were very unconcerned.  Participants were told that that the experimenter 
would instruct them to stop once they had made the requisite number of choices (24) 
from the available information. Therefore, it was not necessary for them to keep track. 
Believability ratings were used as a manipulation check.  Following the completion of the 
computer task, the participants were asked to complete the Speilberger’s State Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI), the Whitely Index, and SAMPI (see Appendixes F, G, H) and 
debriefed about the procedure. 
 
RESULTS 
Overview of the Analysis 
  Analyses were conducted using hierarchal regressions. Hypochondriasis scores 
were standardized and effect coding was used for the categorical variable (in this case, 
condition) using a single vector. The illness fear induction condition was coded as (+1) 
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whereas the illness protective condition was coded as (-1).  The variables were entered 
into the regression equation in the following order: covariate (standardized state anxiety 
ratings); standardized SAMPI scores (Hs tendencies); main effect for experimental 
condition (coded as -1 or +1); and the interaction (computed by multiplying standardized 
SAMPI scores by the condition).   
The following variables were adjusted and/or transformed within the data set.  
The first four trial statements from the illness confirming and disconfirming categories 
were removed from the final counts of statements chosen, because selection of these 
statements was required for the procedure and were not voluntarily selected. Because the 
selection of confirming and disconfirming statements is necessarily reciprocal, we 
examined only the subject’s number of illness confirming statements chosen.  This 
allowed for a single score of selected statements that was reflective of each participant’s 
overall selection preference (representing both the tendency to select illness confirming 
or avoid illness disconfirming information).   
Values relating to concern ratings were coded so that higher values represent 
more concern and lower values represent less concern. In an effort to standardize concern 
ratings within each individual and reduce the variability associated with idiosyncratic 
methods of rating concern, ratings from the illness disconfirming statements were 
subtracted from the corresponding concern ratings from illness confirming statements. As 
a result, the larger these values, the more the participant considered the illness confirming 
information concerning relative to the illness disconfirming information.  All scores for 
all variables were then standardized. 
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Manipulation Check 
Believability ratings represent one aspect of the manipulation check.  Subjects 
were eliminated based on one of two criteria.  First, a total of seven subjects whose 
believability ratings for all of the statements showed little to no variability were taken out 
of the study.  It was suspected that these subjects had suspicious response patterns which 
prevented an accurate way of determining whether or not they had found the procedure to 
be believable.  Second, those subjects who were completely inattentive as noted by the 
experimenter or those who experienced computer malfunctions within the course of the 
experiment were also eliminated.  Computer malfunctions include observations 
documented by research assistants in which subjects had seen nearly identical 
information from opposing doctors in succession as well as instances in which the 
computer program shut down in the middle of the procedure and had to be rebooted.  
Such incidents undermined the believability of the experiment as a whole and it was 
determined that data from these subjects would be affected by the potential decrease in 
authenticity of the procedure. Finally, 3 participants had data missing on at least one of 
the variables of interest. As a result, a total of 167 participants were left for the analyses 
that follow, with 80 in the induction condition and 87 in the control condition.  
Correlations between the Individual Difference Measures 
 A positive correlation (r = .56, p<.0001, N= 167) was found between the Whitely 
and the SAMPI; the two measures of hypochondriasis.  There was no correlation 
observed between the measure of state anxiety (STAI) and the Whitely (r = .00, ns).  The 
STAI and the SAMPI were not significantly correlated (r = .13, ns), however this 
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correlation approached significance in the positive direction. That is, as SAMPI scores 
increased, individuals tended to report more state anxiety.   
 Although the Whitely and SAMPI are both measures of hypochondriacal 
tendencies, the SAMPI has been shown to be the more effective measure of the two when 
working with automated processes (Lecci and Cohen, 2002). For this reason, the 
remaining analyses used the SAMPI as the measure of choice.   
Self-Verification Tendencies  
 It was predicted that there would be a main effect of selection bias with regard to 
hypochondriacal tendencies. That is, individuals were expected to choose relatively more 
items from the illness confirming category as hypochondriasis scores increased. Using 
the above-described hierarchical regression, it was shown that those with higher 
hypochondriacal tendencies did select more illness confirming statements relative to 
those lower in hypochondriacal tendencies as measured by standardized SAMPI scores 
(B = .13, t = 1.66, p < .05).  There was no effect for condition with regard to selection 
bias (B = -.14, t = -.35, ns). Selection bias was not related to the covariate, standardized 
state anxiety scores (B = .07, t = -.87, ns).   
It was also predicted that there would exist an interaction between 
hypochondriasis and the induction for selection bias, yet, this interaction did not emerge 
(B = .10, t = .25, ns).  In other words, individuals higher in hypochondriacal tendencies in 
the illness fear induction condition did not necessarily select more illness confirming 
information relative to those lower in hypochondriacal tendencies who were in the same 
condition. 
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Evaluating Ratings of Concern 
 A main effect emerged for SAMPI scores in regard to the amount of concern 
elicited by illness confirming relative to illness disconfirming statements (B = .18, t = 
2.30, p <.01).  That is, as SAMPI scores increased, individuals exhibit more concern for 
illness disconfirming statements relative to illness confirming statements. Condition was 
not significantly related to these standardized ratings of concern (B = .59, t = 1.53, ns) 
nor was state anxiety (B = .04, t = .47, ns).  We expected an interaction between 
hypochondriacal tendencies (as measured by the SAMPI) and condition with regard to 
these standardized concern ratings.  That interaction emerged, was significant (B = .70, t 
= 1.84, p <.04), and is depicted in Figure 1. Specifically, an increase in standardized 
SAMPI scores was associated with decreased ratings of concern (less concern) over 
illness confirming information relative to concern ratings over illness disconfirming 
information when examining the illness protective condition (B = .32, t = 3.13, p = .002). 
This effect occurred even after controlling for state anxiety ratings. However, in the 
illness induction condition standardized SAMPI scores were unrelated to the standardized 
ratings of concern (B = .04, t = .31, ns).  
 In order to determine if the above-described effects are occurring equally for both 
illness confirming and illness disconfirming statements, a follow-up analysis was 
conducted in which standardized scores for the confirming and disconfirming statements 
were examined separately within the illness protective condition. As depicted in Figure 2, 
it is apparent that as SAMPI scores increase there is an increase in the concern associated 
with receiving physician feedback that disconfirms the presence of an illness (B = .38, t = 
3.94, p <.001). However, the effect is not significant for the illness confirming statements 
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(B = -.13, t = -1.18, ns), though a trend towards significance did emerge. This means that 
the more hypochondriacal the individual, the more one experiences concern when 
receiving physician feedback suggesting that there is no illness, and this effect only 
emerges in the illness protective condition. The effect is also absent (or at least less 
pronounced) when examining illness confirming statements.   
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 Interaction between standardized hypochondriasis scores and 
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Figure 1.  Interaction between standardized hypochondriasis scores and condition   
                with regard to standardized concern ratings. 
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Relation between standardized hypochondriasis scores and illness 
information in regard to absolute concern rating z-scores in the 
illness protective condition
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Figure 2.  Relation between standardized hypochondriasis scores and illness information  
                with regard to absolute concern rating z-scores in the illness protective  
                condition. 
 
 
 28
DISCUSSION 
 
Motivations to Self-Verify 
This study provides evidence that as hypochondriasis scores increase, individuals 
tend to be more concerned about illness disconfirming information relative to illness 
confirming statements.  Specifically, the interaction observed between hypochondriacal 
tendencies and condition with regard to concern suggests that when compared to those 
with more normative health beliefs in a non-health threatening situation, those with 
elevated hypochondriacal tendencies show increased concern when presented with illness 
disconfirming feedback as opposed to illness confirming feedback. Similar to those 
experiencing depression (Swan, Wenzlaff  & Tafarodi, 1992), this study found evidence 
supporting the presence of a self-confirming bias among those with hypochondriacal 
tendencies.   The lack of a significant effect for the concern ratings over illness 
disconfirming feedback among those with more normative health beliefs was most likely 
due to the fact that the information they were viewing confirmed pre-existing beliefs that 
they were well.  However, the sub-clinical hypochondriac’s increased concern after being 
provided the same feedback as those with normative health belief most likely resulted 
from the discrepancy between their own beliefs of being afflicted with illness and the 
information provided by a medical professional that suggested they were well.  Because 
the information given did not agree with the hypochondriacal individuals’ health 
perceptions, the sub-clinical sample was therefore unable to confirm their illness beliefs, 
presenting a significant threat to their self-concept and general perception of themselves.   
Thus, in the context of a doctor’s office, it would be expected that the more 
hypochondriacal a person is, the higher concern would be when they are told they are not 
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ill, and such a response differs from those with lower hypochondriacal tendencies. That 
is, those with more normative health beliefs exhibit concern when told they may have an 
illness (see Weinstein, 1980).  However, this study suggests that in the absence of a 
health threat, those with increased hypochondriacal tendencies would be less concerned 
with information confirming their illness fears and more concerned with illness 
disconfirming information.  When making visits to the doctors when health fears had not 
been activated, it is likely that those with clinical or subclinical manifestations of 
hypochondriasis would be more concerned about information that disconfirms one’s 
health fears as opposed to information that confirms their fears.  
According to the results of this study, those with normative responses to health 
fears should be less likely to show concern when presented with information that is 
suggestive of a serious illness, especially when there is no health threat present. The way 
in which patients respond to health information, particularly those who tend not to reject 
information suggesting that they are ill (as is the case for the hypochondriac), might be a 
helpful tool for medical professionals to consider when questioning the motives behind 
those patients’ numerous doctor visits.  Warwick and Salkovski (2001) state that although 
“difficult” patients (or those who most likely do not have a physical cause for their 
reported symptoms) can provoke a variety of negative emotions in the physician because 
they feel as though they are unable to actually treat them.  In order to maintain the 
hypochondriacal person’s self-concept, medical professionals can best serve those with 
hypochondriacal tendencies by partially confirming some of what the worrisome patient 
believes is true.   This includes respecting the patient’s symptoms and acknowledging the 
validity of the patient’s concerns (Warwick & Salkovski, 2001).   
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Awareness of Biases 
A person with hypochondriasis may view a negative, undesirable event as more 
likely to occur as a result of their motivated reasoning to maintain their self-beliefs 
(Weinstein, 1980). The cognitive mechanisms being utilized are not intended to reach 
accurate conclusions, but directional ones that concur with an alternate set of underlying 
perceptions and beliefs.  Past literature would suggest that people are not aware of their 
own general biases and that behavior aimed at achieving directional goals is due to 
largely unconscious processes (Bargh & Chartrand 1999).  In order to be useful to the 
person, the process leading to their biases regarding illness information are most likely 
automatic.  If this is true, a small effect size would expected relative to processes that are 
characterized by both automaticity and high awareness.  Data from this study indicated a 
small effect size which was only significant in the case of the SAMPI and number of 
illness confirming statements.   This supports the idea that biases are either automatic or 
high in awareness, and that the underlying perceptions and beliefs affect the way that 
those higher in hypochondriacal tendencies arrive at conclusions regarding their health.  
Those evidencing hypochondriacal tendencies are most likely unaware that the reason 
they are biased towards illness confirming information and that this bias function serves 
to protect their irrational health beliefs. 
Problems with Measuring Self-Verification 
One issue with the measurement of self-verification in general is that one can not 
always be sure of what is actually being verified.  Not all people higher in 
hypochondriasis are convinced they have the same illnesses.  One problem in this study 
concerned the possibility that the participants who were higher in hypochondriasis were 
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not necessarily worried about contracting meningitis even though they may have felt 
more vulnerable to other diseases.   Barsky et al. (2001) note that the illnesses and 
diseases that those with hypochondriasis feel most susceptible to include arthritis, ulcers, 
insomnia and diabetes (Barsky et al., 2001).  If higher hypochondriacal participants did 
not feel particularly vulnerable to meningitis despite their college environment, the self-
verification process would not occur.  Also, according to Barsky, Wyshak and Klerman 
(1990), 50 percent of people experiencing high hypochondriacal fears can be initially 
alleviated by primary care reassurance.  Those that may have been concerned about 
meningitis in this study but who were not experiencing chronic hypochondriasis may 
have been reassured in the past or possibly even by the illness disconfirming information 
in this study and therefore were lacking any self-relevant beliefs concerning meningitis to 
verify.   These would also be reasonable explanations for the latter ineffectiveness of the 
induction as well as the small effect size for selection bias and hypochondriasis scores.  
Future considerations might include the modification of the illness used in the study from 
meningitis to an illness or disease such as diabetes or ulcers.  Also, it might be helpful to 
assess participants’ fear of the illness being used in the study ahead of time to ensure they 
feel susceptible and are in fact self-verifying valid fears of contracting that specific 
illness. 
Examining the Effectiveness of the Induction 
The presence of an interaction between hypochondriasis and induction for 
concern provides evidence that the induction was most likely effective in elevating illness 
fears.  However, when the interaction between hypochondriasis and the induction for 
selection bias was examined, there was no effect present, and no main effects of the 
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induction emerged. This raises the possibility that the induction was not optimally 
effective and some situational interpretations may have rendered it less effective.  
Although the believability ratings served as the manipulation check for the confirming 
and disconfirming statements, there was no manipulation check for the induction. This 
makes it difficult to assume that the induction had a particularly strong effect for both 
conditions.  There are a variety of reasons that the induction may not have created a 
stronger effect for the two variables than it did.  First, Lecci and Cohen (2002) have 
established that the perceived nature of a specific health threat, including its salience and 
probability affects the readiness with which one accepts the possibility of having health 
threatening conditions (Lecci & Cohen, 2002).   Despite the fact that meningitis is a 
salient illness on college campuses, some participants were not aware of what it was until 
after reading the provided information (see Appendix C).  Also, the probability of 
contracting meningitis is low and most participants had never come in contact with 
anyone including friends or family who had experienced the illness (and the very few that 
had were released from the participating in the study for ethical reasons).  Another reason 
for the weaker than expected induction effect may have been questionable credibility of 
the induction.  Participants simply may have not believed that it was possible to test for 
an enzyme related to their meningitis susceptibility or had prior knowledge about 
meningitis that raised questions about the validity of the induction procedure and thus, 
their illness fears were not activated to the extent that they would have been had they 
believed that part of the procedure.  
Also, although the testing area was set up to resemble a doctor’s office as much as 
possible and the illness threat was chosen because it was both familiar and prevalent 
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around college campuses, it is possible that these two conditions were not sufficiently 
met.  Participants were may not have been influenced enough to think of the testing area 
as a doctor’s office, nor may they have fully associate the research assistants 
administering the blood pressure and meningitis enzyme test with real doctors, despite 
the fact that they were each wearing a white lab coat and stethoscope.  As a result, illness 
fears in the participants may not have been activated to the degree which was necessary 
in order for them to react accordingly by choosing disproportionately more illness 
disconfirming statements in the case of those who were lower in hypochondriasis and 
disproportionately more illness confirming statements in the case of individuals who 
were higher hypochondriasis.   
An alternative explanation for the minimal effectiveness of the induction may lie 
with the sample of the population being tested.  Participants in this study were college 
students and may not have adequately sampled the higher scorers on hypochondriacal 
tendencies. Indeed, given the youthfulness of the sample, feelings of invulnerability are 
more commonly observed (see Weinstein, 1980).  Thus, the results of the induction may 
not have been of particular importance or interest to them and consequently had less 
influence on how much information they chose from one category as opposed to the 
other. One problem arising from the fact that the induction resulted in an effect for only 
concern and not for the interaction for selection bias is the possibility that the induction 
itself may have made the following computer task slightly less credible.  A likely 
possibility is that participants were conscious of the differences between the two 
categories of information and attempted to regulate the number they chose from each one, 
disregarding the induction process altogether.  In the future, it would be suggested that 
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the induction be modified to address the above concerns in order to maximize its 
potential for creating an illness activating effect.  Suggestions include using a sample of 
older adults as well as an induction that took place in a real health setting with real health 
professionals.   
Assessing Hypochondriasis 
 The moderate correlations between the two measures used to assess 
hypochondriasis in this study can most likely be explained as a difference in the aspects 
of hypochondriasis that each measure intends to assess.  Despite similarities, some of the 
aspects of hypochondriasis that are measured by the SAMPI and Whitely are unique.  
Whereas the Whitely is a more face-valid measure (Lecci, 2004) and is designed to assess 
an individual’s fear of symptoms that are indicative of a possible illness, the SAMPI is a 
more direct measure of intense somatic experiences.  The variance shared between the 
SAMPI and the Whitely in this study was modest and consistent with that observed in the 
literature (Speckens, 2001), suggesting that there is some overlap between the two 
measures.  The reason for this overlap was not directly addressed within this study.  It is 
possible that the shared variance may reflect the fact that these two measures tap into 
some of the same underlying constructs of hypochondriasis.  The overlap could also be 
due to a causal relation in which over a period of time, heightened fears result in 
automated (i.e., well rehearsed) illness-related cognitive processes (Lecci & Cohen, 2002, 
in press).  Thus, it is possible that the two measures might be differentially related 
depending upon the stage of hypochondriacal development in the individual. In the 
context of this study, the use of both the SAMPI and Whitely offered an opportunity in 
which slightly different interpretations for the results could be made according to each 
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measure.  The absence of uniformity among the two measures was actually beneficial 
because it allowed for different variables related to hypochondriasis including selection 
bias and concern to be addressed separately with each measure.  
Measurement of Self-Verification  
If self-verification is one of the aspects of hypochondriasis that is assessed 
differently by the SAMPI and the Whitely, it would be expected that the two measures 
would have related differently to selection bias in this study.  Although hypotheses were 
not made for the individual measures prior to the results, there did exist a difference 
between the SAMPI and Whitely when the association between hypochondriasis and self-
verification was assessed.  Given the automated nature of cognitive processes associated 
with the SAMPI, it’s relation to attentional biases as documented in previous research 
(Lecci & Cohen, 2002, in press), as well as what it intends to assess, one might foresee it 
as being more closely related to the selection of illness related information than the 
Whitely.  Also, those with more inveterate hypochondriacal tendencies could be expected 
to engage in higher rates of self-verification. Indeed, a positive relation was found 
between the SAMPI and the number of illness confirming statements chosen. Conversely, 
the number of illness confirming statements was not related to the Whitely.  This appears 
to suggest that individuals who are higher in the experience of intense somatic 
experiences as measured by the SAMPI tend to selectively attend to information that 
confirms their illness beliefs, a finding that is consistent with the avoidance of cognitive 
dissonance through means of self-verification.  From this information one can assume 
that an elevated SAMPI score is more likely to indicate a high level of resistance to 
illness-related information that fails to agree with one’s perception of their health, more 
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so than would be indicated by an elevated score on the Whitely.  Our results also agree 
with literature suggesting that components of hypochondriasis are not present in the same 
degree among every hypochondriacal person and that although each person will generally 
resist reassuring information, they may not necessarily reject it (Salkovskis, 2001).  
Although the constructs assessed by the Whitely and SAMPI are related to an 
individual’s level of hypochondriasis, the measure in this study that was most applicable 
to self-verification was the SAMPI. 
The Whitely may not be as strongly related to self-verification as is the SAMPI, 
in which case the relation between selection of illness confirming or disconfirming 
information and Whitely scores may be weaker. If increased fear of illness-suggesting 
symptoms does not equate to the experience of those symptoms or that particular illness, 
higher Whitely scores would not result in any self-verification. In this case, the symptoms 
that we focused on were specific to meningitis.  It may be that those with higher 
hypochondriacal tendencies were more concerned about other symptoms that were not 
related to meningitis.  If this is true, it would explain why the Whitely did not show as 
much of an effect.  Participants were not particularly concerned about the symptoms 
presented that related to meningitis, however, they were concerned with other symptoms 
of a different illness as indicated by the Whitely.  The finding implies that the nature of 
hypochondriasis is more symptom-specific rather than generalized.  Highly 
hypochondriacal individuals must be presented with the particular symptoms related to 
the illness that they are concerned about in order to engage in the self-verification 
process.   
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This study’s results indicated that illness-related attitudes as measured by the 
Whitely were not necessarily related to selection of illness confirming information.  
There are a number of reasons why this may have occurred.  Increased fear of illness-
suggesting symptoms as measured by the Whitely does not equate to the experience of 
those symptoms or that particular illness and therefore, may not result in any self-
verification that would lead to the selection of choosing more or less illness confirming 
information.  Secondly, it may be that high Whitely scores (but low scores on the 
SAMPI) indicate that illness-confirming behavior has not become practiced enough to 
become fully automated.  That is, participants in this study with higher scores on the 
Whitely but not on the SAMPI may have consisted of less “experienced” 
hypochondriacs, an idea mentioned in (Lecci, Karoly, Ruehlman, & Lanyon, 1996).  
Although elevated scores on the Whitely indicated higher hypochondriacal tendencies 
and more specifically, increased fearfulness of illness-suggesting information, it did not 
result in the disproportionate selection of illness confirming information.   This may have 
been because hypochondriacal tendencies had not developed to that severity.  In fact, fear 
of symptoms suggesting an illness may have made participants more defensive and 
actually less likely to select illness confirming information than those who had elevated 
SAMPI scores.  For the same reasons, those with lower Whitely scores and higher 
SAMPI scores may have been less afraid of viewing illness confirming information while 
at the same time more likely to want to seek out information confirming their that 
suspected symptoms were related to meningitis. 
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Implications for Use of the SAMPI and Whitely  
These findings present useful information for doctors treating those higher in 
hypochondriacal tendencies as measured by the SAMPI or Whitely.  Individuals with 
hypochondriacal tendencies scoring high on the SAMPI versus those scoring high on the 
Whitely may react to their health professional’s feedback in two very different ways 
depending on which construct associated with hypochondriasis that best characterizes 
their concerns.  Those with higher SAMPI scores may be more likely to attend only to 
illness confirming information, possibly resulting in the perpetuation of illness beliefs 
and continued doctor’s visits (Lecci & Cohen, 2002). Those with higher Whitely scores 
wouldn’t be expected to attend only to information around them suggesting illness, 
however information that did suggest illness would be viewed as more concerning.  The 
Whitely may also coincide more with the individuals concern of illness related 
information presented by a health professional rather than the preference to selectively 
attend to on type of illness related information.  Findings in this study emphasizes the 
individualization of the condition of hypochondriasis, suggesting the use of both 
measures to best predict the manner in which a person with higher hypochondriacal 
tendencies will react to illness confirming or disconfirming information. 
Alternative Explanations for the Data 
Swann, Stein-Seroussi and Giesler (1992) contend that people seek interaction 
partners (e.g., doctors) who satisfy “positivity strivings” such as allowing them to achieve 
self-improvement, win converts, interact with someone who has similar attitudes or 
someone who is very perceptive.  This finding applies to both those seeking positive and 
negative evaluators (Swann et al., 1992).  Similar to other studies examining preference 
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for negative or positive evaluations (Swann, 1992), the evaluations in the current study 
did not come from medical professionals, but rather, from a computerized evaluator 
instead.  Thus, the effect might have been different had the feedback resulted from human 
interactions.  It is also possible that the underlying motive to meet positivity strivings 
may not be equally applied when considering the differences between which aspects of 
hypochondriasis that the SAMPI and Whitely Index measure.  Those seeking positivity 
strivings who were higher in hypochondriasis would be expected to seek out relatively 
more illness-confirming information and score higher on the SAMPI, but not necessarily 
score higher on the Whitely.  Although a valid theory, the results of this study are unable 
to confirm that the motivation to self-verify was due solely to positivity strivings.   
However, results do seem to support some aspects of the cognitive dissonance 
theory.  The self-verification that did occur with elevated SAMPI scores may have been 
motivated by cognitive dissonance. That is, participants were acting to avoid cognitive 
dissonance in order to reduce psychological anxiety caused by discrepant beliefs and 
actions (Festinger, 1962).  This could have been further tested by looking at the happiness 
of people based on their test scores after completing the computer task.  Individuals with 
elevated hypochondriasis scores selected relatively more information from the illness 
confirming category, which also means that they avoided information from the illness 
disconfirming category.  According to cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1967) 
choosing information from the illness disconfirming statements would be an action that 
was discrepant with beliefs of possibly having an illness, and so that information was 
avoided by those higher in hypochondriasis as measured by the SAMPI.  By selecting 
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relatively more statements that were illness confirming, participants essentially avoided 
any information that was inconsistent with their beliefs. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
The use of a computer to provide illness confirming and disconfirming 
information to the participant was a limitation to the generalizability of this study.  
Although the computerized manner of relating information was advantageous in that it 
served to eliminate variability that would have occurred when using research assistants as 
doctors, it also failed to mimic reality in a number of ways.  First, there were a number of 
computer malfunctions during the procedure.  Also, using a computerized task minimized 
elements of personalization of information that would be present within the doctor-
patient interaction.  For example, participants in this study may not have seen information 
as personally relevant to them and therefore, may not have responded to the computerized 
feedback in the same way as they would have in a situation in which illness confirming 
and disconfirming feedback was provided by individuals considered to be health 
professionals.   
Participants in this study were also given the option to choose from illness 
confirming and illness disconfirming information.  Although this allowed us to assess 
their preference for feedback, individuals in a real doctor’s office are not given this 
option.  Typically, they present the doctor with their symptoms, followed by a physical 
checkup that the doctor uses to confirm or disconfirm whether they are ill.  The use of the 
computerized task did not provide this level of attention and thus, may not have been 
viewed as being fully credible by the participants as would a real-life situation.   
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Feedback given by a doctor in a medical setting would most likely evoke much 
more concern as compared to feedback given by a computer during a psychology 
experiment.  Thus, ratings may not have been truly reflective of the level of concern 
caused by feedback from doctors in most real-life situations.  Although this research was 
limited in the resources it was allowed to use, future studies might avoid these issues by 
utilizing a different setting for which the procedure is to take place, such as a real 
doctor’s office where the subject’s established health professional is the provider of 
feedback.  This would make the study more believable overall as well as add the element 
of reality needed for the feedback to be taken seriously. 
This study provides evidence of bias for illness confirming information among 
those higher in hypochondriacal tendencies, but the fact that the induction produced an 
effect with only one of the variables examined may somewhat limit  the ability to 
examine this phenomenon in the case where illness fears were fully activated.  Even 
though the illness fear induction was similar to that of Croyle and Ditto (1990), it had to 
be modified given the university setting and available supplies and this may have 
contributed to its reduced effectiveness.  It is suggested that the procedure in this study 
either be modified either to match Croyle and Ditto’s (1990) procedure exactly, or that 
another form of illness fear induction within ethical standards be used in the future.  Most 
likely, the lack of interaction for selection bias in this study can be attributed to the some 
of the properties of the induction and it is believed that future studies might observe this 
effect under the proper illness fear activating circumstances.   
Other future considerations might include the modification of the illness used in 
the study from meningitis to an illness that would correspond to the possible symptom-
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specific nature of a given hypochondriac.  It might be helpful to assess participants’ fear 
of the illness being used in the study ahead of time to ensure they feel susceptible and are 
in fact self-verifying valid fears of contracting that specific illness.  Also, future studies 
should include additional measures following the feedback procedure that would allow 
for the assessment of awareness of biases including asking participants what their goals 
were when choosing information as well as administering a state anxiety measure before 
and after the feedback procedure.  A manipulation check that is additional to the 
believability ratings should be utilized to ensure the effectiveness of the induction as 
well.  Directions for future research might explore to a further extent the awareness of 
illness information biases, whether awareness differs in those scoring high on the Whitely 
from those with high scores on the SAMPI, as well as investigating methods of 
modifying feedback given to highly hypochondriacal individuals in a way that is more 
assuring and less threatening to their self-concept.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
